Testing can counteract proactive interference by integrating competing information by NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro & Wahlheim, Chris
Testing can counteract proactive interference by integrating competing information 
By: Christopher N. Wahlheim 
Wahlheim, C. N. (2015). Testing can counteract proactive interference by integrating competing 
information. Memory & Cognition, 43(1), 27-38.doi:10.3758/s13421-014-0455-5 
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Memory & 
Cognition. The final authenticated version is available online at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-014-0455-5 
***© Psychonomic Society Inc. Reprinted with permission. No further reproduction is 
authorized without written permission from Springer. This version of the document is not 
the version of record. Figures and/or pictures may be missing from this format of the 
document. *** 
Abstract: 
Testing initially learned information before presenting new information has been shown to 
counteract the deleterious effects of proactive interference by segregating competing sources of 
information. The present experiments were conducted to demonstrate that testing can also have 
its effects in part by integrating competing information. Variations of classic A–B, A–D paired-
associate learning paradigms were employed that included two lists of word pairs and a cued-
recall test. Repeated pairs appeared in both lists (A–B, A–B), control pairs appeared in List 2 
only (A–B, C–D), and changed pairs appeared with the same cue in both lists but with different 
responses (A–B, A–D). The critical manipulation was whether pairs were tested or restudied in 
an interpolated phase that occurred between Lists 1 and 2. On a final cued-recall test, participants 
recalled List 2 responses and then indicated when they recollected that responses had earlier 
changed between lists. The change recollection measure indexed the extent to which competing 
responses were integrated during List 2. Change was recollected more often for tested than for 
restudied pairs. Proactive facilitation was obtained in cued recall when change was recollected, 
whereas proactive interference was obtained when change was not recollected. These results 
provide evidence that testing counteracted proactive interference in part by making List 1 
responses more accessible during List 2, thus promoting integration and increasing later 
recollection of change. These results have theoretical implications because they show that testing 
can counteract proactive interference by integrating or segregating competing information. 
Keywords: Proactive interference | Testing effects | Change recollection | Reminding | 
Integration 
Articles: 
A large body of evidence has shown that by promoting the act of retrieval, testing can enhance 
memory in several ways (for reviews, see Roediger & Butler, 2011; Roediger & 
Karpicke, 2006a). One way that testing can enhance memory is by counteracting the deleterious 
effects of proactive interference. Proactive interference occurs when prior learning impairs 
memory for more recently learned information (for reviews, see Anderson & Neely, 1996; 
Crowder, 1976; Postman & Underwood, 1973). The primary mechanism by which testing has 
been held to counteract proactive interference is by segregating competing sources of 
information (e.g., Szpunar, McDermott, & Roediger, 2008; Tulving & Watkins, 1974). 
Consistent with this view, testing has been shown to induce context change (Pastötter, Schicker, 
Niedernhuber, & Bäuml, 2011; see also Jang & Huber, 2008), reduce cue overload (Nunes & 
Weinstein, 2012), and increase test expectancy (Weinstein, Gilmore, Szpunar, & 
McDermott, 2014). Although segregating competing information has long been shown to be 
effective for counteracting proactive interference (e.g., Underwood & Ekstrand, 1967), testing 
might also have its effects in an opposite way. The purpose of the present study is to show that 
testing can counteract proactive interference by promoting the integration of competing 
information. 
The effects of testing on proactive interference have most prominently been demonstrated in 
multiple-list learning paradigms (e.g., Darley & Murdock, 1971; Nunes & Weinstein, 2012; 
Pastötter et al., 2011; Szpunar et al., 2008; Weinstein et al., 2014). For example, in Szpunar et al. 
(2008), participants studied five lists of words that were sometimes related and sometimes 
unrelated across lists. The primary manipulation was the task that intervened between study lists. 
Following each study list, groups of participants were either given a recall test or they were not 
tested. Groups that were not tested were either given additional study opportunities or completed 
distractor tasks. Following study, all participants were given a recall test on the final list 
following a short filled delay and a cumulative recall test over all the lists following a longer 
delay. The critical comparison was performance on both of these recall tasks for tested and 
nontested groups. Evidence that testing counteracted proactive interference was shown on the 
test of the final list by more words being correctly recalled for tested than nontested groups, and 
more intrusions from prior lists for nontested than tested groups. Similar evidence was shown on 
the final cumulative recall test in that more words from the entire experiment were correctly 
recalled for tested than nontested groups. These results were interpreted as showing that testing 
improved source monitoring by segregating lists. 
Another paradigm that has been used to demonstrate that testing can counteract proactive 
interference is the A–B, A–D paired-associate learning paradigm. For example, in Tulving and 
Watkins (1974), participants were instructed to study two lists of word pairs that contained left 
members (cues) that were the same in both lists paired with right members (responses) that 
changed between lists. The critical manipulation was whether or not immediate cued-recall tests 
followed Lists 1 and 2. In the final phase, participants completed a modified free recall (MMFR) 
test in which cues from the studied lists appeared with instructions to recall responses from both 
lists. Including an immediate test of List 1 resulted in List 2 responses being better recalled on 
both List 2 and MMFR tests than when a List 1 test was not included. However, the effect was 
only obtained when the entire list was tested in a between-subjects design. When only a subset of 
items was tested in a within-subjects design, proactive interference did not differ for tested and 
nontested items. These results were interpreted as showing that testing List 1 in its entirety was 
required to segregate it from the subsequent presentation of List 2, whereas list segregation could 
not be accomplished when only a portion of the List 1 items was tested. 
The paradigms described above can produce two types of proactive interference effects: list-level 
and item-level. In multiple-list learning paradigms (e.g., Szpunar et al., 2008), proactive 
interference has list-level effects in that the presentation of prior lists impairs memory for 
subsequent lists, but effects on individual items cannot be directly assessed. In contrast, in A–B, 
A–D paradigms (e.g., Tulving & Watkins, 1974), proactive interference can have both list- and 
item-level effects. Item-level effects are often of primary interest in A–B, A–D paradigms, and 
they are shown when memory for List 2 pairs is worse for pairs with responses that changed 
from List 1 to List 2 than control pairs with only one response in List 2. Outside of the lab, 
multiple-list learning paradigms represent situations in which earlier blocks of learning create 
global impairment in memory for later blocks of learning, such as when a student shows 
impaired memory for information from the latter of back-to-back classes. In contrast, the A–B, 
A–D paradigm represents situations in which changes in specific associations impair memory for 
more recent associations, such as when one attempts to remember an acquaintance’s married 
name after having previously known the acquaintance by her maiden name. 
The distinction between these types of proactive interference is important for understanding how 
testing can have its effects. In both cases, segregating sources of information could make the 
sources more distinguishable, thus decreasing proactive interference. However, segregation 
might not be the only optimal strategy for paired-associate learning. Effective segregation of 
overlapping associations (A–B, A–D) results in traces for each association being represented 
independently. Under these circumstances, retrieval of target associations requires precise 
reinstatement of context to avoid retrieving competing associations. However, if the 
reinstatement of context is impoverished, then retrieval of shared cues can have the undesirable 
consequence of eliciting unwanted responses. Thus, effective segregation requires creating 
sufficiently distinct contexts at encoding. An alternative strategy is to integrate competing 
associations by specifying their relationship to one another so that the associations will be 
represented together with their relationship in a unified trace. During encoding, this would 
involve considering both associations in the same context along with their relationship to one 
another. A broader reinstatement of context could be sufficient to provide access to the 
integrated trace, and relational information could be used distinguish associations postretrieval. 
It is reasonable to hypothesize that interpolated testing promotes integration in A–B, A–D 
paradigms because retrieval practice of List 1 pairs makes them more accessible when changed 
pairs are studied in List 2. In this vein, Wahlheim and Jacoby (2013) recently examined the role 
of a retrieval-based mechanism (i.e., reminding) in the integration of competing responses in an 
A–B, A–D paradigm. In their study, participants were presented with two lists of word pairs with 
repeated pairs appearing in both lists (A–B, A–B), control pairs appearing only in the second list 
(A–B, C–D), and changed pairs appearing with the same cue in both lists and a different 
response in each list (A–B, A–D). After learning List 1, participants studied List 2 and were told 
to indicate when they noticed changed pairs, a form of reminding referred to as change detection. 
On a final cued-recall test of List 2, a remindings-report procedure was employed in which 
participants attempted to recall List 2 responses, and then reported whether another word came to 
mind prior to their response. Instances in which List 1 responses were reported as coming to 
mind prior to responses output were taken as evidence that the change detected in List 2 had 
been recollected at test. These instances were validated as reflecting integrated traces in that they 
occurred exclusively for items detected as changed in List 2. Recall of List 2 responses did not 
differ overall between A–B, A–D and A–B, C–D items, showing no evidence for proactive 
interference. This lack of difference resulted from performance on A–B, A–D items constituting 
a mixture of proactive facilitation and proactive interference that depended on whether change 
had been recollected after it had been detected. Proactive facilitation was obtained when change 
was detected and recollected in that recall performance was greater for A–B, A–D than A–B, C–
D items. In contrast, proactive interference was obtained when change was detected but not 
recollected in that recall performance was lower for A–B, A–D than A–B, C–D items. 
To explain these results, Wahlheim and Jacoby (2013) forwarded a memory-for-change account 
that held that when change was detected in List 2, the retrieval of a List 1 response facilitated the 
formation of an integrated trace that included responses from each list along with the retrieval 
event that fostered their integration (for similar accounts of the role of study-phase retrieval in 
memory for temporal order, see Hintzman, 2010; Tzeng & Cotton, 1980; Winograd & 
Soloway, 1985). Change recollection enhanced memory performance because integrated traces 
containing both responses and their relative study order could be retrieved. In contrast, when 
change was detected but not recollected, memory performance was impaired because earlier 
retrieval of the List 1 competitor made it more accessible, and thus more likely to compete with 
the target response from List 2. In the parlance of dual-process theory (e.g., Jacoby, 1991), 
change recollection opposed the enhanced strength of List 1 competitors resulting from change 
detection, but in its absence, the greater strength of List 1 was the primary basis for responding. 
Following this, Jacoby and Wahlheim (2014) provided a more direct demonstration of the role of 
change detection in the integration of responses in an A–B, A–D paradigm. To do this, they 
adopted a variant of the looking back procedure (Jacoby, 1974) to manipulate the extent to which 
participants looked for change that occurred between Lists 1 and 2. Their paradigm was similar 
to that of Wahlheim and Jacoby (2013), except that pairs that repeated across lists (A–B, A–B) 
were replaced by A–B, A–D pairs that changed within List 2, and the remindings-report 
procedure at test was replaced by a yes/no change recollection measure. During study of List 2, 
groups of participants were instructed either to look for pairs that changed from any point earlier 
in the experiment or to only look for pairs that changed from earlier in List 2. Of primary interest 
was how List 2 recall and change recollection for A–B, A–D items that changed between lists 
(between-list A–B, A–D items), differed as a function of looking-back instructions (for a similar 
procedure used to examine spaced repetition effects, see Wahlheim, Maddox, & Jacoby, 2014). 
For the group that looked for change within List 2, the results revealed no difference in List 2 
recall between A–B, C–D and between-list A–B, A–D items. In contrast, for the group who 
looked for change in both lists, List 2 recall was greater for between-list A–B, A–D items than 
for A–B, C–D items, showing proactive facilitation in overall performance. Change recollection 
for between-list A–B, A–D items was greater for the group who looked for change in both lists, 
showing that more integrated traces were established by encouraging retrieval of List 1 A–B 
pairs when studying List 2 A–D pairs. Finally, replicating Wahlheim and Jacoby (2013) 
proactive facilitation was found for A–B, A–D pairs when change was detected and recollected, 
whereas proactive interference was found when change was detected but not recollected. These 
results showed that the benefits of change recollection on recall were due to trace integration 
fostered by change detection. 
The findings of Jacoby and Wahlheim (2014) have important theoretical implications, in that a 
segregation account would predict that encouraging retrieval of competing responses from a 
previous list would further impair memory by increasing proactive interference. In contrast, just 
the opposite was found: Encouraging retrieval of competing information resulted in proactive 
facilitation in overall recall performance. Testing List 1 competitors prior to List 2 could serve a 
function similar to that of encouraging retrieval of List 1 during the presentation of List 2. It has 
recently been suggested that completing a test trial increases the likelihood of study-phase 
retrieval on a subsequent study trial (S. M. Nelson, Arnold, Gilmore, & McDermott, 2013). 
Taken with the increased accessibility of List 1 pairs produced by retrieval practice, testing List 1 
should increase the contact made between A–B and corresponding A–D pairs during List 2 
study. 
The present experiments build on the previous work by Wahlheim and Jacoby by exploring the 
effects of interpolated testing on change recollection and its effects on List 2 recall. Specifically, 
an A–B, A–D paradigm was employed here to explore the possibility that testing memory for 
List 1 pairs prior to presenting List 2 can counteract proactive interference in a manner similar to 
directing retrieval to List 1 while studying List 2 (Jacoby & Wahlheim, 2014). The three item 
types used by Wahlheim and Jacoby (2013) were employed here: pairs repeated across lists (A–
B, A–B); pairs appeared only in List 2 (A–B, C–D); and pairs with the same cue but responses 
that changed from List 1 to List 2 (A–B, A–D). The critical manipulation was the task 
interpolated between Lists 1 and 2. The interpolated task included (a) tested items that were cues 
for the recall of List 1 responses and (b) restudied items that were repeated presentations of List 
1 items. Importantly, the interpolated task was manipulated within subjects, such that only half 
of List 1 was tested. This was done because a segregation account holds that the entire list must 
be tested in order to counteract proactive interference (e.g., Tulving & Watkins, 1974). Thus, if 
testing counteracts proactive interference when only a portion of the list is tested, its effects 
cannot be explained by a segregation account. The effects of interpolated testing were compared 
with those of interpolated study to ensure that testing benefits would not simply be due to 
increased exposure during the interpolated task. A change detection measure was not employed 
in List 2 because it would encourage the retrieval of List 1 responses, which could diminish 
differences between the interpolated task conditions. A yes–no change recollection measure was 
included on the final cued-recall test. 
Proactive interference was expected for restudied but not for tested items, for reasons described 
above. Testing effects were expected to be due to the promotion of integrated traces, as shown by 
greater change recollection for tested than for restudied items. Finally, consistent with 
the memory-for-change account, proactive facilitation was expected when change was 
recollected, and proactive interference was expected when change was not recollected, consistent 
with several earlier studies (Jacoby & Wahlheim, 2014; Jacoby, Wahlheim, & Yonelinas, 2013; 
Putnam, Wahlheim, & Jacoby, 2014; Wahlheim, 2014; Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2013). 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was designed to demonstrate the positive effects of List 1 testing on change 
recollection and proactive interference in an A–B, A–D paradigm. The design was similar to that 
of Wahlheim and Jacoby (2013), but different materials were used. Wahlheim and Jacoby had 
used three-word sets that each included one cue (e.g., knee) and two responses (e.g., bone, bend). 
Some of the cues and responses were semantically related, resulting in low average associations 
among the terms, and all responses were orthographically related, because they were originally 
intended to complete the same word fragment (e.g., b_n_). In contrast, the three-word sets used 
here included cues that were semantically related to the responses, but the responses were neither 
semantically nor orthographically related to one another (e.g., pearl–harbor, pearl–jewelry). 
Changing the materials in this way served two purposes. First, pilot studies had shown that these 
materials produced proactive interference in overall performance when List 1 was not tested, 
which was necessary for determining whether List 1 testing would eliminated proactive 
interference. Second, mediation accounts of failures to find interference effects (e.g., Barnes & 
Underwood, 1959) typically attributed those failures to spreading activation between related 
responses increasing memory performance. Here, a mediation account could not explain 
variations in proactive effects of memory that depend on change recollection, because the 
response terms were unrelated (see also Wahlheim, 2014). Finally, another difference was that 
change recollection judgments were made on a continuous scale. This was done to determine 
whether change recollection certainty would differ on the basis of the type of interpolated task. 
Method 
Participants 
A group of 48 students from Washington University participated in exchange for $10/h or partial 
course credit. Participants were tested individually. 
Design and materials 
A 3 (Item Type: A–B, A–B vs. A–B, C–D vs. A–B, A–D) × 2 (Interpolated Task: test vs. 
restudy) within-subjects design was used. The materials consisted of 90 three-word sets, each 
including a cue word (e.g., pearl) and two responses that were associated with the cue but not 
with each other (e.g., harbor, jewelry). The average forward and backward associative strengths 
between cues and responses were low, on average (forward, M = .04, SD = .02, range = .01–.09; 
backward, M = .02, SD = .03, range = .00–.18), as indexed by D. L. Nelson, McEvoy, and 
Schreiber (1998). The materials were divided into six groups of 15 sets and rotated through 
conditions, resulting in six experimental formats. The groups served equally often across 
participants. 
The experiment consisted of four phases: List 1, Interpolated Task, List 2, and List 2 Test (see 
Table 1 for a schematic of the design). List 1 consisted of 60 word pairs that were divided evenly 
between two groups that later became A–B, A–B or A–B, A–D items (30 each). Those groups 
were evenly divided into subgroups that were later restudied or tested in the interpolated task (15 
each). The interpolated task consisted of the 60 pairs presented in List 1 divided into groups as 
just described. List 2 consisted of 90 pairs, divided evenly across the three items types (30 each), 
with half of the A–B, A–B and A–B, A–D items earlier having been restudied and the other half 
having been tested (15 each). The 30 A–B, C–D items were not subjected to the interpolated task 
manipulation. A–B, A–B items were repetitions of pairs that had appeared in List 1 (e.g., baby–
cute, baby–cute); A–B, C–D items appeared for the first and only time in List 2 (e.g., soup–
bowl); and A–B, A–D items appeared with cues from List 1 paired with changed responses in 
List 2 (e.g., pearl–harbor, pearl–jewelry). For A–B, A–D items, the designation of responses to 
lists remained constant across formats. 
Table 1. General design schematic for Experiments 1 and 2 
Item 
Type 
List 1 (60 Items) Interpolated Task (60 Items) List 2 (90 
Items) 




30 A–B items; repeated 
in List 2 (A–B) 
15 test (A–?) 30 A–B items 15 test (A–?) 
15 restudy (A–B) 15 restudy (A–?) 
A–B, A–
D 
30 A–B items; changed 
in List 2 (A–D) 
15 test (A–?) 30 A–D items 15 test (A–?) 
15 restudy (A–B) 15 restudy (A–?) 
A–B, C–
D 
    30 C–D items 30 (C–?) 
 
Procedure 
In List 1, word pairs appeared individually in random order for 4 s each followed by a 1-s 
interstimulus interval (ISI). Participants were told to read the pairs for an upcoming test. In the 
interpolated task, restudied pairs appeared just as in List 1, whereas tested pairs appeared as cues 
paired with question marks (e.g., pearl–?). Pairs appeared individually in random order for 4 s 
each, followed by a 1-s ISI. Participants were told to read restudied pairs aloud and to study 
them, and to retrieve the List 1 responses for tested pairs before the 4 s expired. Responses were 
made aloud and written down by an experimenter. In List 2, the word pairs appeared individually 
in random order for 4 s each, followed by a 1-s ISI. Participants were told to read them aloud and 
study them for an upcoming memory test. At test, cues paired with question marks again 
appeared individually in random order, and participants were told to recall the responses 
presented in List 2 and to type them into the computer. Participants were encouraged to make a 
response for every item, guessing if necessary. After attempting to recall the List 2 response, 
participants indicated how certain they were that a pair had earlier changed from List 1 to List 2. 
A sliding scale appeared beneath each item with a slider directly in the middle. Participants were 
told to move the slider left to indicate that the item had not changed, to the right to indicate that 
the item had changed, and to leave the slider in the middle to indicate uncertainty regarding 
change. No values were assigned to the scale from the participants’ perspective, but participants 
were told that more extreme movements to the left and right indicated greater certainty. 
Participants were told to make their ratings precisely and to use the full range of the scale. 
Results and discussion 
The criterion for statistical significance was set at alpha = .05. Main effects that were qualified 
by significant interactions are not reported. Variations in degrees of freedom are due to the 
exclusion of participants without at least one observation in every cell in conditional analyses. 
Cued recall 
Table 2 shows that testing List 1 items in the interpolated phase counteracted proactive 
interference. Cued recall of List 2 responses on the final test did not differ between tested A–B, 
A–D items and A–B, C–D items, t(47) = 0.35, p = .73, but recall was lower for restudied A–B, 
A–D items than for A–B, C–D items, t(47) = –3.76, p < .001. List 2 recall of A–B, A–D items 
was also lower in the restudy than in the test condition, t(47) = –2.67, p = .01. More evidence 
that testing counteracted proactive interference was shown by List 1 intrusions for A–B, A–D 
items being substantially lower on the final recall test for tested than for restudied items (.20 vs. 
.34), t(47) = –5.67, p < .001. In addition, repeating items across lists increased performance for 
both interpolated conditions. Final recall was higher for A–B, A–B than for A–B, C–D items in 
both interpolated task conditions, smallest t(47) = 14.26, p < .001. Final recall was also higher 
for restudied than for tested A–B, A–B items, t(47) = 2.68, p = .01, which is consistent with 
earlier studies that had shown a recall advantage for restudying over testing when the final test 
occurred after a short delay (e.g., Roediger & Karpicke, 2006b). The advantage for restudied 
over tested A–B, A–B items was due to testing only benefitting items that were correctly recalled 
in the interpolated phase. Final recall of A–B, A–B items in the tested condition was 
dramatically greater for items correctly recalled in the interpolated phase than for those that were 
incorrectly recalled (.97 vs. .63), t(47) = 9.41, p < .001. Finally, no difference in List 1 recall 
emerged for pairs in the interpolated task that eventually became A–B, A–B or A–B, A–D items 
(.49 vs. .49), t(47) = –0.10, p = .92. Most critical to the issue of testing effects on proactive 
interference, these results show that testing counteracted proactive interference even when only a 
portion of the list was tested, which cannot be explained by a segregation account (cf. Tulving & 
Watkins, 1974). The presence of restudied items in the interpolated task discouraged segregation 
by increasing the likelihood that contact would be made between Lists 1 and 2. 
Table 2. Cued recall of List 2 responses as a function of item type and interpolated task: 
Experiments 1 and 2 
  Item Type 
Experiment Interpolated Task A–B, A–B A–B, C–D A–B, A–D 
Experiment 1 Test .77 (.02) .48 (.02) .47 (.03) 
Restudy .81 (.02) .48 (.02) .40 (.03) 
Experiment 2 Test .89 (.02) .57 (.03) .49 (.04) 
Restudy .87 (.02) .57 (.03) .47 (.04) 
The A–B, C–D items did not differ for the interpolated task conditions. Consequently, List 2 
recall performance for those items is displayed twice for comparison with the other items. 
Standard errors of the means are presented in parentheses. 
Change recollection 
Change recollection rates were compared for the interpolated task conditions to determine 
whether testing eliminated proactive interference by enhancing the integration of competing 
responses. The change recollection measure recorded responses numerically on a scale from .00 
to 1.00. Responses made to the left of the midpoint of the scale, indicating that change was not 
recollected, ranged from .00 to .49. Responses made to the right of the midpoint, indicating that 
change was recollected, ranged from .51 to 1.00. Responses made on the midpoint, indicating 
uncertainty about change recollection, were recorded as .50. Change recollection was indexed as 
the probability of responses occurring to the right of the midpoint (>.50), and failure to recollect 
change was indexed as the probability of responses occurring to the left of the midpoint (<.50), 
both regardless of the values. 
The change recollection results provide evidence that testing List 1 in the interpolated phase 
promoted the integration of competing responses for A–B, A–D items. Table 3 shows that 
change was recollected more often for tested than for restudied A–B, A–D items. Comparisons 
of change recollection rates for A–B, A–D items took into account false alarms on both other 
item types. The first analysis of change recollection rates included A–B, A–B false alarms. The 
advantage in change recollection rates for tested as compared to restudied items was greater for 
A–B, A–D than for A–B, A–B items, F(1, 47) = 4.51, p = .04, η p 2 = .09. The second analysis of 
change recollection rates included A–B, C–D false alarms. Given that A–B, C–D items were not 
subjected to the interpolated task manipulation, change recollection rates for both types of A–B, 
A–D items were compared individually with the overall false alarm rate for A–B, C–D items. 
Change recollection rates were higher for A–B, A–D items than for A–B, C–D items, and those 
rates were higher for tested than for restudied A–B, A–D items, smallest t(47) = 5.20, p < .001. 
The higher rates of change recollection for tested A–B, A–D items depended on the accuracy of 
List 1 recall in the interpolated phase. Change recollection was greater following correct than 
following incorrect recall of List 1 responses in the interpolated phase (.70 vs. .49), t(47) = 
3.93, p < .001, and this presumably reflects change being detected more often during List 2 when 
List 1 responses had been recalled. Change recollection did not differ between tested items that 
were not recalled in the interpolated phase and restudied items (.49 vs. .45), t(47) = 1.03, p = .31. 
Finally, change recollection certainty was compared between tested and restudied A–B, A–D 
items. The average certainty was higher for tested than for restudied items (.63 vs. .51), t(47) = 
4.85, p < .001, but this merely reflected change being recollected more often for tested items. 
When change was recollected, the average certainty did not differ between the test and restudy 
conditions (.90 vs. .91), t(46) = 1.19, p = .24. 
Table 3. Probabilities of change recollection as a function of item type and interpolated task: 
Experiments 1 and 2 
  Item Type 
Experiment Interpolated Task A–B, A–B A–B, C–D A–B, A–D 
Experiment 1 Test .18 (.02) .15 (.02) .60 (.03) 
Restudy .10 (.02) .15 (.02) .45 (.03) 
Experiment 2 Test .06 (.01) .05 (.01) .68 (.04) 
Restudy .06 (.02) .05 (.01) .50 (.04) 
The change recollection probabilities reflect all levels of change recollection certainty. The A–B, 
C–D items did not differ for the interpolated task conditions and are presented twice for 
comparison with the other items. Standard errors of the means are presented in parentheses. 
Cued recall conditionalized on change recollection 
List 2 recall conditionalized on change recollection showed that testing eliminated proactive 
interference by increasing change recollection, which produced proactive facilitation in the recall 
of A–B, A–D items. Replicating earlier studies, Table 4 shows that overall List 2 recall 
performance for A–B, A–D items reflected a mixture of proactive facilitation when change was 
recollected and proactive interference when change was not recollected. Cued recall was greater 
for A–B, A–D items when change was recollected than for A–B, C–D items in both interpolated 
task conditions, smallest t(45) = 2.75, p = .009, and cued recall for those A–B, A–D items did 
not differ between interpolated task conditions, t(45) = 0.02, p = .98. In contrast, cued recall was 
lower for A–B, A–D items when change was not recollected than for A–B, C–D items, 
smallest t(45) = –5.07, p < .001, and cued recall for those A–B, A–D items did not differ 
between interpolated task conditions, t(45) = 1.59, p = .12. Importantly, the magnitudes of 
proactive facilitation and proactive interference effects did not differ for tested and restudied 
items, showing that the recall advantage for tested A–B, A–D items could be completely 
accounted for by the increase in change recollection. 
Table 4. Cued recall of List 2 responses conditionalized on change recollection, as a function of 
item type and interpolated task: Experiments 1 and 2 
  Item Type 
Experiment Interpolated 
Task 
A–B, A–D, Change 
Recollected 
A–B, C–D A–B, A–D, Change 
Not Recollected 
Experiment 1 Test .58 (.04) .48 (.02) .28 (.04) 
Restudy .58 (.04) .48 (.02) .22 (.03) 
Experiment 2 Test .65 (.04) .57 (.03) .09 (.03) 
Restudy .61 (.04) .57 (.03) .28 (.04) 
The A–B, C–D items did not differ for the interpolated task conditions. Consequently, List 2 
recall for those items is displayed twice for comparison with the other items. Standard errors of 
the means are presented in parentheses. 
Finally, the memory-for-change account of proactive effects of memory was supported by the 
results from List 1 intrusions rates on the final recall test. As was described in the introduction, 
the account holds that change recollection serves to oppose the accessibility of List 1 competitors 
on a final test of List 2 responses. Thus, the account predicts that when List 1 responses are 
correctly recalled for items tested in the interpolated phase, List 1 intrusions on the final test 
should be far less likely when change is recollected, because change recollection preserves the 
temporal order of responses. Consistent with this account, when List 1 responses were correctly 
recalled in the interpolated phase, the probability of List 1 intrusions on the final test for A–B, 
A–D items was dramatically lower when change was recollected than when it was not (.20 vs. 
.79), t(35) = –7.49, p < .001. Together, these results show that testing eliminated proactive 
interference in part by enhancing the integration of competing responses and the later 
recollection of change that opposed the accessibility of competitors from List 1. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was conducted to replicate the effects of interpolated testing on change 
recollection and the effects of change recollection on List 2 recall performance. Experiment 2 
was also conducted to explore the boundary conditions of these effects by including feedback 
following testing in the interpolated task. The positive effects of testing on later memory 
performance can be enhanced by providing feedback, especially for information that cannot 
initially be recalled (e.g., Butler, Karpicke, & Roediger, 2008; Butler & Roediger, 2008; 
Karpicke & Roediger, 2007; McDaniel & Fisher, 1991). In Experiment 1, change recollection for 
tested A–B, A–D items was greater for items that were correctly recalled during the interpolated 
phase than for those that were not. Consequently, the provision of feedback could enhance 
participants’ ability to detect change for items that were not recalled initially, leading to greater 
change recollection and enhanced overall recall of List 2 responses on the final test. However, 
the increased accessibility of List 1 responses resulting from feedback does not guarantee a 
proportional increase in change recollection at test. An alternative possibility is that feedback 
could increase the accessibility of the List 1 responses, which would enhance the detection of 
change, but without a corresponding increase in the recollection of change the enhanced 
accessibility of competitors would hurt memory performance more when change was not 
recollected. A similar result was shown by Wahlheim (2014), in that increasing the number of 
List 1 presentations increased change recollection but also had the offsetting effect of producing 
greater proactive interference when change was not recollected. 
Another change made in Experiment 2 was that the change recollection measure was no longer 
continuous. This was done to simplify analyses, because the continuous measure in 
Experiment 1 did not reveal any differences between interpolated task conditions. 
Experiment 2 included a dichotomous yes–no self-report measure of change recollection that 
followed the List 2 recall attempts. When participants reported recollecting change, they were 
subsequently asked to recall the List 1 response. If testing with feedback increases the 
accessibility of List 1 items beyond those that were restudied, then List 1 recall following change 
recollection should be greater for tested than for restudied items. 
Method 
Participants 
A group of 36 students from Washington University participated in exchange for $10/h or partial 
course credit. Participants were tested individually. 
Design, materials, and procedure 
The design, materials, and procedure were identical to those of Experiment 1, with the following 
exceptions. The presentation duration for items presented in the interpolated phase was 6 s. For 
tested items, cues appeared with question marks for 4 s, during which time participants were told 
to recall the response from List 1. The correct response then appeared below for an additional 
2 s. Participants were told to respond to every item. This was done to encourage retrieval 
attempts for all items and to prevent the strategy of waiting for feedback to appear. At test, 
change recollection was assessed using a dichotomous yes–no self-report measure. After 
participants had typed in their List 2 recall attempts, the message “Did the right word change 
from List 1 to List 2?” appeared above boxes labeled “Yes” and “No.” Participants clicked on 
the boxes to enter their responses. When participants indicated that they recollected change, they 
were then asked to type in the response that had appeared in List 1. 
Results and discussion 
Cued recall 
In contrast to Experiment 1, the bottom rows of Table 2 show that proactive interference was 
obtained in overall recall of List 2 responses for both types of A–B, A–D items. List 2 recall was 
lower for both tested and restudied A–B, A–D items than for A–B, C–D items, smallest t(35) = –
3.25, p = .003, and did not differ between A–B, A–D item types, t(35) = 0.53, p = .60. Only a 
marginally significant difference in List 1 intrusions emerged on the final recall test between 
tested and restudied A–B, A–D items (.25 vs. .29), t(35) = 1.85, p = .07. Consistent with 
Experiment 1, repeating items across lists increased performance for both interpolated 
conditions. Final recall was higher for A–B, A–B than for A–B, C–D items in both interpolated 
task conditions, smallest t(35) = 12.99, p < .001. However, unlike in Experiment 1, final recall 
for A–B, A–B items did not differ between interpolated task conditions, t(35) = 1.25, p = .22, 
and trended in the opposite direction, showing a numeric advantage for tested items, even though 
the final test was given immediately following List 2 study (cf. Roediger & Karpicke, 2006b). 
This was explained by final recall performance on tested A–B, A–B items showing a smaller 
difference between items that had been correctly and incorrectly recalled in the interpolated 
phase (.96 vs. .85), t(35) = 3.55, p = .001, relative to Experiment 1. Feedback in the interpolated 
phase increased the final recall of A–B, A–B items incorrectly recalled in the interpolated phase 
to a relatively greater extent than the recall of items correctly recalled in the interpolated phase, 
because performance on the latter condition was at ceiling. Finally, as in Experiment 1, no 
difference in List 1 recall was apparent in the interpolated phase for pairs that eventually became 
A–B, A–B or A–B, A–D items (.53 vs. .51), t(35) = 0.60, p = .56. 
These results show that testing did not eliminate proactive interference in overall performance as 
in Experiment 1. However, despite the similarity in performance between the interpolated 
conditions for A–B, A–D items here in Experiment 2, it is likely that the overall levels of List 2 
recall were accomplished in different ways. Testing might have counteracted proactive 
interference to a greater extent than restudy, but the inclusion of feedback could potentially have 
resulted in greater offsetting effects of proactive interference when change was not recollected, 
because of the increased accessibility of List 1 responses. 
Change recollection 
Change recollection rates were compared for the interpolated task conditions, as in 
Experiment 1. The change recollection results again provide evidence that testing List 1 
promoted the integration of responses. The bottom rows of Table 3 show that change was 
recollected more often for tested than for restudied A–B, A–D items. The analysis of change 
recollection including A–B, A–B false alarms showed that the advantage in change recollection 
for tested as compared to restudied items was greater for A–B, A–D than for A–B, A–B 
items, F(1, 35) = 41.77, p < .001, η p 2 = .54. In addition, the analysis of change recollection 
including A–B, C–D false alarms showed that change recollection was higher for A–B, A–D 
items than for A–B, C–D items, and that those rates were higher for tested than for restudied A–
B, A–D items, smallest t(35) = 6.61, p < .001. In contrast to Experiment 1, change recollection 
for tested A–B, A–D items did not depend on correct recall of the List 1 responses in the 
interpolated phase, because feedback was provided. Change recollection did not differ for A–B, 
A–D items that were correctly or incorrectly recalled in the interpolated phase (.70 vs. .66), t(35) 
= 0.94, p = .35 showing that, as compared to Experiment 1, feedback selectively increased 
change recollection for A–B, A–D items that were incorrectly recalled in the interpolated phase. 
Cued recall conditionalized on change recollection 
As in Experiment 1, cued recall conditionalized on change recollection showed that testing 
counteracted proactive interference, despite the finding that proactive interference was obtained 
in overall recall performance. The bottom rows of Table 4 show that when change was 
recollected, proactive facilitation was obtained in recall of tested A–B, A–D items, but neither 
proactive facilitation nor proactive interference was obtained for restudied A–B, A–D items. 
Cued recall was greater for tested A–B, A–D items for which change was recollected than for A–
B, C–D items, t(33) = 2.49, p = .02, and cued recall for restudied A–B, A–D items for which 
change was recollected did not differ from that for A–B, C–D items, t(33) = 0.84, p = .41; 
however, cued recall did not differ between tested and restudied A–B, A–D items when change 
was recollected, t(35) = 0.64, p = .53. In contrast, when change was not recollected, proactive 
interference was obtained in recall of both types of A–B, A–D items, with the magnitude of 
proactive interference being greater in the test than in the restudy condition. Cued recall was 
lower for both types of A–B, A–D items when change was not recollected than for A–B, C–D 
items, smallest t(33) = –6.61, p < .001. Cued recall was also lower for tested than for restudied 
A–B, A–D items when change was not recollected, t(33) = –3.22, p = .003. These results show 
that testing did not eliminate proactive interference in overall recall performance as in 
Experiment 1, because increasing the accessibility of List 1 competitors with feedback increased 
proactive interference when change was not recollected more than it increased proactive 
facilitation when change was recollected. Evidence that testing with feedback enhanced the 
accessibility of List 1 responses beyond restudy was shown by List 1 intrusions on A–B, A–D 
items on the final recall test being greater in the test than in the restudy condition when change 
was not recollected (.74 vs. .53), t(33) = 3.20, p = .003, and by List 1 responses being recalled 
more often following change recollection on A–B, A–D items in the test than in the restudy 
condition (.87 vs. .74), t(35) = 4.01, p < .001. 
Finally, the memory-for-change account of proactive effects of memory was again supported by 
the List 1 intrusion rates. When the List 1 responses were correctly recalled in the interpolated 
phase, the probability of List 1 intrusions on the final test for A–B, A–D items was dramatically 
lower when change was recollected than when it was not (.09 vs. .87), t(30) = –10.77, p < .001. 
Together, these results again show that testing counteracted proactive interference in part by 
enhancing the integration of competing responses and the later recollection of change that 
opposed the accessibility of competitors. 
General discussion 
The present experiments demonstrated that testing counteracted proactive interference in part by 
enhancing the integration of competing responses. Response integration was indexed by change 
recollection, which presumably reflected memory for traces that were earlier integrated when 
change was detected during List 2 study. Change recollection occurred more often for A–B, A–D 
items that were tested in the interpolated phase than for those that were restudied. The provision 
of feedback in the interpolated phase tended to increase change recollection, but also had the 
negative effect of enhancing the strength of competitors and consequent proactive interference 
when change was not recollected, consistent with the effects of increasing List 1 presentations 
(Wahlheim, 2014). Together, these results suggest that one role of testing is to promote the 
integration of competing information, but the effects of testing on overall recall performance 
depend on the extent to which the detection of change can be later recollected. 
The results from Experiment 1 differed from those of Tulving and Watkins (1974), in that they 
had found that interpolated testing did not counteract proactive interference when it was 
manipulated within subjects. The exact reason for this discrepancy is unclear, due to the variety 
of differences between studies. However, two primary differences provide a potential 
explanation. Tulving and Watkins used sets of words that were neither semantically nor 
orthographically related, and they only tested a quarter of the A–B pairs that corresponded to A–
D pairs in a subsequent list. These conditions discouraged contact between lists and could have 
resulted in tested pairs behaving similarly to nontested pairs, because items were unlikely to be 
integrated. Furthermore, even if some items were integrated, offsetting effects of proactive 
interference in the absence of change recollection could have obscured benefits in overall recall 
performance from presenting. In contrast, the present study employed materials in which the 
cues were semantically related to the responses, but the responses were not related to each other. 
These materials had earlier produced change recollection rates comparable to those from 
materials for which all terms were semantically related, and both types of items produced change 
recollection rates that were substantially higher than the rates produced by unrelated sets 
(Wahlheim, 2014). In addition, half of the List 1 items were tested in the present study, which 
did more to encourage detection of change in List 2 than did testing only a quarter of the items. 
Together, these features made the conditions in the present study more conducive to integration, 
which likely contributed to the elimination of proactive interference effects in overall recall of 
List 2 responses for the subset of items tested in the interpolated phase following List 1. 
The notion that integrative processes can counteract proactive interference is consistent with 
findings from several studies (e.g., Jacoby, 1974; Jacoby & Wahlheim, 2013, 2014; Jacoby et 
al., 2013; Putnam et al., 2014; Wahlheim, 2014; Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2013), and more generally 
with findings showing that integration counteracts interference produced by retrieval-induced 
forgetting (Anderson & McCulloch, 1999) and fan effects (Radvansky & Zacks, 1991). More 
relevant to the present study, several studies in the testing-effect literature have also shown 
indirect evidence that testing promotes integration in the form of test-enhanced memory for both 
studied materials and related but unstudied materials (for a review, see Carpenter, 2012). For 
example, testing has been shown to enhance the recall of unstudied prose material related to 
studied material (Chan, McDermott, & Roediger, 2006), the classification of novel exemplars of 
earlier-studied natural categories (Jacoby, Wahlheim, & Coane, 2010), knowledge-based 
inferences (Butler, 2010), and transfer of rules to novel materials within the same knowledge 
domain (Kang, McDaniel, & Pashler, 2011). More direct evidence that testing promotes 
integration was also shown by Wissman, Rawson, and Pyc (2011), in that testing in the interim 
between passages of connected discourse improved the comprehension of material beyond other 
interpolated tasks. 
Although many studies have provided evidence that testing promotes integration, there is no 
general consensus on the mechanisms that underlie these effects. An important contribution of 
the present article is that it provides a potential account of how testing could promote integration. 
As was described in the introduction, the memory-for-change account holds that detecting 
change results from the retrieval of earlier-learned information during the learning of new 
information. The information from both occasions then becomes integrated into a unitary 
representation. Later recollection of change provides access to the integrated representation that 
preserves the temporal relationship of information from the separate occasions. Competing 
sources of information can be distinguished using relational information within an integrated 
trace, but the representation of an integrated trace differs from those formed via segregation. 
Trace integration produces a unitary representation, whereas segregation produces distinct traces 
that are represented independently. Importantly, testing appears to increase the frequency of 
study-phase retrievals and later recollection of integrated representations. Although the memory-
for-change account of testing effects on proactive interference in a paired-associate learning 
paradigm cannot fully explain other related phenomena showing integrative effects of testing, the 
account does point to a study-phase retrieval mechanism being critical for the integration of 
information. Moreover, the generality of a study-phase retrieval account of integrative effects of 
testing has been shown in studies demonstrating the positive effects of looking back for both 
paired associates (Jacoby & Wahlheim, 2014) and individual verbal category exemplars (Jacoby 
& Wahlheim, 2013). Also related, the detection of contradictions in text produces similar 
memorial benefits (Otero & Kintsch, 1992). It is possible that testing in situations using more 
complex materials could foster integrated representations by encouraging study-phase retrieval, 
but more research will be needed to determine the exact nature of those representations. 
Despite the evidence for the role of an integrative mechanism in the effects of testing on 
proactive interference shown here, it is likely that other mechanisms also play important roles in 
these effects. The integrative mechanism forwarded here is likely to play a role in many 
situations, but the representations posited here might only be effectively formed when the 
number of competing units is manageable. In contrast, a segregation mechanism might play a 
more prominent role in situations that involve a greater number of competing responses. For 
example, Szpunar et al. (2008) showed that interpolating tests among five 18-word study lists 
improved free recall on a test of the final list and decreased intrusions as compared to when 
interpolated study or distractor tasks were employed. These effects were obtained both when 
several exemplars from various categories were distributed across lists and when unrelated words 
populated the lists. An integration mechanism of the sort proposed in the present study could not 
easily explain the effects on final recall performance, because the representations would have to 
preserve relational information across lists of items instead of between two responses paired with 
the same cue. In addition, study-phase retrievals that preserve relative order are unlikely to occur 
when the materials are unrelated words. There is also evidence that other processes contribute to 
the segregation of lists in the Szpunar et al. paradigm. For example, Pastötter et al. (2011) used 
an electroencephalograph measure to infer that attention was greater during study trials when 
retrieval tasks rather than study or distractor tasks were interpolated between lists, presumably 
due to shifts of context. Also, Nunes and Weinstein (2012) showed that testing increased correct 
recall of categorically related items without increasing false recall of related but unstudied lures, 
presumably by reducing cue overload. Finally, Weinstein, Gilmore, Szpunar, and McDermott 
(2014) showed that test expectancy on study trials was greater when tests rather than distractor 
tasks were interpolated, and this presumably facilitated subsequent encoding and later 
segregation of lists. These findings show that a comprehensive account of testing effects on 
proactive interference will require consideration of a variety of mechanisms and their 
interactions with learning conditions. 
It is likely that the conditions in which testing is employed will play an important role in 
determining the primary mechanism that is responsible for its effects. In addition to situational 
influences, differences in learner-initiated goals might also influence the primary mechanism of 
testing effects. As a concrete example, consider students in an educational context. Testing with 
the goal of integration can be employed when students quiz themselves to prepare for exams or 
when students take exams in courses in which the concepts build throughout the semester. In 
contrast, testing with the goal of segregation can be employed when students need to offload 
information to increase the availability of transient neural activity required for directing attention 
to and sustaining attention on a different topic. The modulation of these uses for testing is likely 
to reflect individual differences in attentional control and the use of situation-appropriate 
learning strategies. It is possible that students who perform poorly due to deficits in attentional 
control might suffer when segregation is required because goal-directed attempts to forget 
previously retrieved information ironically make that information more accessible (cf. 
Jacoby, 1999; Wegner, 1994). This could result in students making distant connections among 
concepts following retrieval attempts, but would also lead to greater confusion resulting from 
interference among unrelated ideas. Examination of the interactions among attentional control, 
testing effects, proactive effects of memory, and generalization of knowledge would be very 
informative. 
In conclusion, the present study provides evidence that testing can promote the integration of 
competing information and increase later recollection of integrated traces. This finding adds to 
the testing-effect literature by showing that testing can counteract proactive interference by 
integrating competing information. The function of testing likely depends on the situation in 
which it is used, the capability of individuals to control their attention, and the strategy 
motivating the use of testing. Future research should explore which variables influence the 
mechanism that is primarily responsible for testing effects on proactive interference, both for 
theoretical purposes and to optimize the use of testing to enhance student learning. 
Notes 
Author Note 
This research was supported by a Collaborative Activity Award from the James S. McDonnell 
Foundation awarded to Larry Jacoby, and by Grant No. 5T32AG000030-38 from the National 
Institute on Aging. Thanks to Larry Jacoby for his substantial contributions to the ideas 
presented here, Ashley Bartels for her assistance with manuscript preparation and data collection, 
and Heather Bartels and Kara Golebiowski for their assistance with data collection. 
References 
1. Anderson, M. C., & McCulloch, K. C. (1999). Integration as a general boundary 
condition on retrieval-induced forgetting. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 25, 608–629. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.25.3.608  
2. Anderson, M. C., & Neely, J. H. (1996). Interference and inhibition in memory retrieval. 
In E. L. Bjork & R. A. Bjork (Eds.), Memory (Handbook of Perception and 
Cognition) (2nd ed., pp. 237–313). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.  
3. Barnes, J. M., & Underwood, B. J. (1959). “Fate” of first-list associations in transfer 
theory. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58, 97–105. doi: 10.1037/h0047507  
4. Butler, A. C. (2010). Repeated testing produces superior transfer of learning relative to 
repeated studying. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 36, 1118–1133. doi: 10.1037/a0019902  
5. Butler, A. C., Karpicke, J. D., & Roediger, H. L., III. (2008). Correcting a metacognitive 
error: Feedback increases retention of low-confidence correct responses. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 34, 918–928. 
doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.34.4.918  
6. Butler, A. C., & Roediger, H. L., III. (2008). Feedback enhances the positive effects and 
reduces the negative effects of multiple-choice testing. Memory & Cognition, 36, 604–
616. doi: 10.3758/MC.36.3.604  
7. Carpenter, S. K. (2012). Testing enhances the transfer of learning. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 21, 279–283.  
8. Chan, J. C. K., McDermott, K. B., & Roediger, H. L., III. (2006). Retrieval induced 
facilitation: Initially nontested material can benefit from prior testing of related 
material. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 135, 553–571. 
doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.135.4.553  
9. Crowder, R. G. (1976). Principles of learning and memory. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.  
10. Darley, C. F., & Murdock, B. B., Jr. (1971). Effects of prior free recall testing on final 
recall and recognition. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 91, 66–73. 
doi: 10.1037/h0031836  
11. Hintzman, D. L. (2010). How does repetition affect memory? Evidence from judgments 
of recency. Memory & Cognition, 38, 102–115. doi: 10.3758/MC.38.1.102  
12. Jacoby, L. L. (1974). The role of mental contiguity in memory: Registration and retrieval 
effects. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 13, 483–496. 
doi: 10.1016/S0022-5371(74)80001-0  
13. Jacoby, L. L. (1991). A process dissociation framework: Separating automatic from 
intentional uses of memory. Journal of Memory and Language, 30, 513–541. 
doi: 10.1016/0749-596X(91)90025-F  
14. Jacoby, L. L. (1999). Ironic effects of repetition: Measuring age-related differences in 
memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 25, 3–
22. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.25.1.3  
15. Jacoby, L. L., & Wahlheim, C. N. (2013). On the importance of looking back: The role of 
recursive remindings in recency judgments and cued recall. Memory & Cognition, 
41,625–637. doi: 10.3758/s13421-013-0298-5  
16. Jacoby, L. L., & Wahlheim, C. N. (2014). Memory consequences of looking back: 
Noticing and recollecting change. Manuscript submitted for publication.  
17. Jacoby, L. L., Wahlheim, C. N., & Coane, J. H. (2010). Test-enhanced learning of natural 
concepts: Effects on recognition memory, classification, and metacognition. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 36, 1441–1451.  
18. Jacoby, L. L., Wahlheim, C. N., & Yonelinas, A. P. (2013). The role of detection and 
recollection of change in list discrimination. Memory & Cognition, 41, 638–649. 
doi: 10.3758/s13421-013-0313-x  
19. Jang, Y., & Huber, D. E. (2008). Context retrieval and context change in free recall: 
Recalling from long-term memory drives list isolation. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 34, 112–127. doi: 10.1037/0278-
7393.34.1.112  
20. Kang, S. H. K., McDaniel, M. A., & Pashler, H. (2011). Effects of testing on learning 
functions. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 18, 998–1005. doi: 10.3758/s13423-011-
0113-x  
21. Karpicke, J. D., & Roediger, H. L., III. (2007). Expanding retrieval practice promotes 
short-term retention, but equally spaced retrieval enhances long-term retention. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 33, 704–719. 
doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.33.4.704  
22. McDaniel, M. A., & Fisher, R. P. (1991). Tests and test feedback as learning 
sources. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 16, 192–201.  
23. Nelson, S. M., Arnold, K. M., Gilmore, A. W., & McDermott, K. B. (2013). Neural 
signatures of test-potentiated learning in parietal cortex. Journal of Neuroscience, 
33,11754–11762. 
24. Nelson, D. L., McEvoy, C. L., & Schreiber, T. A. (1998). The University of South 
Florida word association, rhyme, and word fragment norms [Database]. Retrieved 
from http://w3.usf.edu/FreeAssociation/ 
25. Nunes, L. D., & Weinstein, Y. (2012). Testing improves true recall and protects against 
the build-up of proactive interference without increasing false recall. Memory, 20, 138–
154.  
26. Otero, J., & Kintsch, W. (1992). Failures to detect contradictions in a text: What readers 
believe versus what they read. Psychological Science, 3, 229–235. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9280.1992.tb00034.x  
27. Pastötter, B., Schicker, S., Niedernhuber, J., & Bäuml, K.-H. T. (2011). Retrieval during 
learning facilitates subsequent memory encoding. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 37, 287–297. doi: 10.1037/a0021801 
28. Postman, L., & Underwood, B. J. (1973). Critical issues in interference theory. Memory 
& Cognition, 1, 19–40.  
29. Putnam, A. L., Wahlheim, C. N., & Jacoby, L. L. (2014). Memory for flip-flopping: 
Detection and recollection of political contradictions. Memory & Cognition. 
doi: 10.3758/s13421-014-0419-9  
30. Radvansky, G. A., & Zacks, R. T. (1991). Mental models and the fan effect. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 17, 940–953. 
doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.17.5.940  
31. Roediger, H. L., III, & Butler, A. C. (2011). The critical role of retrieval practice in long-
term retention. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15, 20–27. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2010.09.003  
32. Roediger, H. L., III, & Karpicke, J. D. (2006a). The power of testing memory: Basic 
research and implications for educational practice. Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 1, 181–210. doi: 10.1111/j.1745-6916.2006.00012.x  
33. Roediger, H. L., III, & Karpicke, J. D. (2006b). Test-enhanced learning: Taking memory 
tests improves long-term retention. Psychological Science, 17, 249–255. 
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01693.x  
34. Szpunar, K. K., McDermott, K. B., & Roediger, H. L., III. (2008). Testing during study 
insulates against the buildup of proactive interference. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 34, 1392–1399. doi: 10.1037/a0013082  
35. Tulving, E., & Watkins, M. J. (1974). On negative transfer: Effects of testing one list on 
the recall of another. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 13, 181–193. 
doi: 10.1016/S0022-5371(74)80043-5  
36. Tzeng, O. J., & Cotton, B. (1980). A study-phase retrieval model of temporal 
coding. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 6, 705–716. 
doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.6.6.705  
37. Underwood, B. J., & Ekstrand, B. R. (1967). Studies of distributed practice: XXIV. 
Differentiation and proactive inhibition. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 74, 574–
580.  
38. Wahlheim, C. N. (2014). Proactive effects of memory in young and older adults: The role 
of change recollection. Memory & Cognition, 42, 950–964. doi: 10.3758/s13421-014-
0411-4 
39. Wahlheim, C. N., & Jacoby, L. L. (2013). Remembering change: The critical role of 
recursive remindings in proactive effects of memory. Memory & Cognition, 41, 1–15. 
doi: 10.3758/s13421-012-0246-9  
40. Wahlheim, C. N., Maddox, G. B., & Jacoby, L. L. (2014). The role of reminding in the 
effects of spaced repetitions on cued recall: Sufficient but not necessary. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 40, 94–105. 
doi: 10.1037/a0034055  
41. Wegner, D. M. (1994). Ironic processes of mental control. Psychological Review, 
101, 34–52. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.101.1.34  
42. Weinstein, Y., Gilmore, A. W., Szpunar, K. K., & McDermott, K. B. (2014). The role of 
test expectancy in the build-up of proactive interference in long-term memory. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 40, 1039–1048. 
doi: 10.1037/a0036164  
43. Winograd, E., & Soloway, R. M. (1985). Reminding as a basis for temporal 
judgments. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
11, 262–271. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.11.2.262  
44. Wissman, K. T., Rawson, K. A., & Pyc, M. A. (2011). The interim test effect: Testing 
prior material can facilitate the learning of new material. Psychonomic Bulletin & 
Review, 18,1140–1147. doi: 10.3758/s13423-011-0140-7  
 
